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In this paper we aim to show that philosophy can be helpful in creative think-
ing. Although we take into account only selected philosophical concepts and 
rules, we will try to demonstrate that a person who has a good command over 
these few ideas can formulate new ideas and projects when confronted with 
new and demanding situations. Correspondingly, the ability to think abstractly 
in some specific circumstances can lead to positive and unexpected results. In 
this way, the mind “plasticity” that results from a philosophical education can 
become an engine of creativity. This article concerns people who study philo-
sophy (formally or informally) and who in their professional lives are involved 
in various jobs and activities where creative thinking is needed and even re-
quired. In general, the paper is a part of philosophical heuristics.1
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introduction
Nowadays creative thinking is widely promoted. We constantly look for new factors 
which refresh our thinking and make us ready to face new challenges. Various human 
activities, both theoretical and practical as well as those sometimes least expected, can 
bring with them inspiration and support (e.g. sport; see Kačerauskas, Tamošauskas 
2015). Consequently, the search for new ideas and solutions should embrace an in-
clusive approach. We need creative thinking in many spheres of our lives along with 
the technical and exact sciences, social sciences, art and humanities, in addition to 
numerous others human activities. In the Western world, we find that the cultural and 
scientific achievements of the past do not appear to be sufficient for our continued 
1 For a broader presentation of philosophical heuristics, see the article by Jutta Schickore (2014).
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wellbeing. Thus, progress is often perceived as a matter of new discoveries, inven-
tions and ideas. On the one hand, many noble institutions with massive funding and 
social support are dedicated to this purpose (most notably universities). On the other, 
we realize that real novelties are not so easily achievable. It is not only a matter of 
a proper organization, e.g. of the academic world or artistic circles. Although these 
formal settings are helpful and can be stimulating, the real engine of advancement 
is the human being with his original thinking and ingenuity. Only the human being 
can look at things in a new way and recognize that things can work differently. Only 
the human being can devise new tools that cater to human needs in novel and more 
effective ways. At any rate, everything starts with the mental capacity to see things in 
a new or different way. Creative thinking has its source in such an attitude.2
Can philosophy provide any assistance in developing and cultivating that attitude? 
There are two possible but opposing answers. From one point of view, it would appear 
that philosophy is not particularly well suited to this specific task. It is connected 
with a complex net of ideas and projects developed throughout the history of human 
thought. Yet it seems that in order to become creative we must detach precisely from 
that historical and cultural burden. It is argued that this liberation is what paves the 
way for new perceptions, new approaches, and new ideas. This theory gains further 
support with the realization that these days any progress is achieved within narrow 
fields of scientific or scholarly specializations. Philosophy deals with general ideas so 
it seems to proceed in the opposite direction.
From the other point of view, it looks as if philosophy may offer a unique advant-
age because of the hermeneutical character of its discourse. Here, new categories are 
formulated in a kind of dialectic carried out between the present and the past. The 
former brings with it new events produced by culture and science while the latter of-
fers us a rich and multifaceted heritage. In this way, the philosophical mind is always 
stimulated to answer the challenges of the present by drawing upon the resources of 
past achievements. Nevertheless, although this discourse generally operates within a 
theoretical dimension, it also occurs in practical philosophy with regard to pragmatic 
strategies and solutions. It is here that creativity is the result of an encounter between 
the present and the past, or between what should be done and what has been done.
Generally speaking, philosophy anchors us in the past and its achievements insert 
us into a kind of cultural background. The latter is indeed a resource insofar as it 
represents past efforts and successes in addition to offering us a picture of what is 
2 Of course, animals are also creative and can act creatively. Nevertheless, there is an essential difference 
between human and animal creativity. The latter stems from instinct, whereas the former comes from ra-
tional motives. Michael Tomasello points out in his books (2001; Tomasello et al. 2009) that an ability to 
use various tools is associated with a degree of intentionality. The human being possesses the kind of in-
tentionality that enables him to detach from a thing given in an immediate perception and move to a sphere 
of thoughts, ideas and theoretical projects. What is worked out here can then be transmitted to the physical 
world. Animals in turn possess a much more simplistic kind of intentionality, which enables them to manip-
ulate an immediately given environment. Human achievements can be conceptualized and taught, put under 
critique and modified. Animals cannot learn from each other’s experience and thus their creativity cannot be 
enhanced. Hence, real novelty can only come from human creativity.
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possible according to established models of knowledge. Of course, we can be over-
whelmed by this heritage and even, in a certain sense, imprisoned by it. In this case, 
the achievements and ideas of the past will be construed as imposing limits on our 
thinking and action. But the opposite scenario is also possible. Past accomplishments 
and inventions can play positive and constructive roles, especially when we are con-
fronted with new challenges of various kinds. These roles can be liberating – as, for 
example, when they help us to avoid certain errors and traps in our investigations; at 
the same time, they can also be inspiring, inviting us to assume pro-creative attitudes.
In this article we are going to concentrate on the latter approach to creativity, show-
ing that there are some traditional philosophical concepts3 that can play both roles. In 
so doing, we are closer to those metaphorically oriented theories than the scientifically 
oriented ones which motivate creative thinking according to a distinction introduced 
by Aaron Kozbelt, Ronald A. Beghetto and Mark A. Runco (2010: 22). Of course, the 
philosophy we reference does employ methodologically strict thinking. Even so, in many 
cases it is not an investigative approach typical of scientific thinking given the latter’s 
concentration on facts and scientific methods. In contrast, philosophy deals with general 
and theoretical concepts but can also work out many less general notions and projects.4 
It can be applied to problems which arise outside its well-defined subject matter. For 
example, philosophical methods can successfully capture problem situations in techno-
logy, biotechnology or business. This enables us to look at them in a different light or 
from new angles. Moreover, philosophy seems to be particularly well-equipped to help 
us “focus more on hypothetical or ‘as if’ modes of thinking” (Kozbelt et al. 2010: 22), 
which in turn fuel a creative approach to various problems.
Taking into account various philosophical concepts and other strategies, we do not 
want to claim that these are the one-and-only true tools that can describe an existing 
reality. Such an assertion would take us too far afield from our focus in this paper. Here, 
we only want to emphasize that the person who is familiar with these specific theor-
etical factors is uniquely well-equipped to think creatively. Thus, our focus is on the 
subjective side of creativity.5 We want to show that the mindset of such an individual 
3 By “traditional philosophical concepts” we mean the concepts associated with the philosophy of Plato and 
Aristotle and their commentators as well as with thinkers inspired by these ancient figures. The essence of the 
philosophy we have in mind in writing this paper is also associated with such concepts. Philosophy is for us a 
kind of theoretical knowledge that cannot be confirmed or rejected by the exact sciences. On the contrary, the 
latter contain some indispensable philosophical presuppositions. Thus understood philosophy plays a heur-
istic role. We are convinced that philosophy will also provide some conceptual tools in the process of solving 
theoretical and practical problems. In this way, it plays an essential role in critical and creative thinking.
4 Ethics is a good example. Thus, general ethics is concerned with general principles for moral action, whereas 
applied ethics is about less general rules and imperatives. Usually one is connected with the other although 
in various, sometimes complex, ways.
5 In discussing “the subjective side of creativity” we do not refer to the subject’s idiosyncrasies. We are also 
aware that a subject can belong to a non-human family. Nevertheless, we limit our understanding of creative 
subjectivity to humans and their activities. Human creativity is strictly associated with thinking and lan-
guage, which is an indispensible tool in basic classifications. We are interested in what way a subject uses 
creative thinking, while looking for new heuristics, in solving given problems. Moreover, we are concerned 
with creativity considered from the first-person perspective.
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can produce a creative personality. Of course, this is a possibility not a necessity. With 
regard to novel and creative thinking we want to emphasize the so-called context of dis-
covery, namely how new ideas and projects are formulated. This includes highlighting 
the necessary presuppositions and basic conditions of creative thinking. Consequently, 
we will not be concerned with emotions but instead, the rational and intuitive elements. 
In this way, we will try to avoid the accusation of any kind of subjectivism.
To begin, being creative cannot be constituted by the above-mentioned elements. 
Something more is needed as an additional resource, i.e. specialist knowledge associ-
ated with a given field of research. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine, in posit-
ive terms, how much knowledge is needed in order to be creative. At the very least, 
we can exclude the proposition that greater knowledge equals greater creativity. The 
connection between the two is complex and intricate, and we are not going to solve 
their interaction in this paper. Let us assume therefore that a good level of specialist 
knowledge is required. As concerns the creative approach, the former may be con-
sidered the matter while the latter (creative thinking) the form. Correspondingly, the 
philosophy-oriented personality that we will sketch in this essay is only a prerequisite 
of being creative, though, as we sustain, a very important and promising prerequisite.
Theoretical notions in action: a first approach
At first glance, theoretical concepts employed by philosophy seem detached from and 
alien to practical thinking. They appear to have more to do with cognition for the sake 
of cognition rather than with cognition for the sake of practice. But an attempt to un-
derstand them in depth often reveals the opposite. Let us take the principle of finality. 
It has its origins in the thought of Aristotle who pointed out that “action for an end is 
present in things which come to be and are by nature” (1941b: II, 8). In contemporary 
interpretations, there are three ways the term “end” can be understood: we can point to 
the end of a given action; the end of an acting agent; and the end of an action as its ac-
tual consequences (Herbut 1997a: 550). In a certain way, these distinctions form a part 
of very advanced philosophical discussions, especially within metaphysics. As a result, 
any attempt to understand the term “end” from within this context is both a complex 
and difficult endeavor which can distract us from the action-oriented attitude. However, 
these are not the only possible ways in which this term can be construed. We can, for 
instance, think of it as that which orders our perceptions in any given enterprise.
An example may help lend some clarity to this definition of “end”. Let us assume 
that the inventor is someone who tends to discover something new. Evidently this 
desire for “something new” is that which motivates him in the course of his research. 
In one sense, the end here is fundamentally understood as a final outcome of his ef-
forts. But before the final stage is achieved, the researcher has in mind a certain kind 
of subjective intuition that a new thing can indeed be invented (subjective end). This 
intuition is usually conditioned by a paradigm within which the researcher operates. 
In other words, the paradigm amounts to a kind of background of these basic intu-
itions. The inventor employs also the various experimental strategies and tools, which 
have their own ends (viz. consequences to which they usually lead). Yet these ends 
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are not mutually exclusive; rather, there exists of interplay between them. First, it can 
happen that even if the researcher is convinced that a given strategy assists him in 
fulfilling a personal end, the same strategy may produce other results, e.g. uninten-
ded side-effects. Second, it is also possible – at least in a number of cases – to ignore 
the intended ends of the tools altogether in order to obtain a result to which those 
tools usually do not lead. In this way, subjective ends (intended ends) can be achieved 
despite the ends prescribed by the tools themselves. Third, ends understood as con-
sequences of actions are not usually strictly deterministic; often they are probabilistic. 
Correspondingly, it is not always possible to avoid unintended consequences.
To summarize, subjective ends are our projections, while employed tools serve as 
methods of verification. At the same time, consequences can be unexpected in the 
sense that they all cannot be foreseen. When we adopt an approach that assumes that 
many subjective ends should be taken into account at the very outset (at least hypo-
thetically) then we become open to a multiplicity of results. Creativity starts from our 
well-grounded imagination and an attitude of openness.
Another example of a theoretical concept employed by philosophy is the principle 
of non-contradiction. Aristotle in his Metaphysics puts it in the following way: “the 
same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and 
in the same respect; or […] it is impossible for any one to believe the same thing to 
be and not to be” (1941a: IV, 3). This rule helps purify our thinking from mistakes 
concerning the same thing. Applied to new theories, it warns us against using ideas 
which exclude or contradict each other within the same project. Employed to new 
things and inventions, it prevents us from setting up functions which exclude, con-
tradict, or attenuate each other. With regard to creative thinking, this principle helps 
us to design things that are integrated and coherent in and of themselves. They are to 
offer us something new, that is to give us a better quality of applicability and enhance 
our dealing with, e.g., everyday problems and difficult situations.
The pragmatic value of such a principle can be seen when we take into account the 
character of contemporary machines and computers, which are increasingly complex 
systems. Take, for example, the many different tablets and cell phones. It is very easy 
to be confused as to their adequate and proper usage. They are like small computers 
possessing a wide rage of functions. To be creative here is to design things which 
harmoniously join two essential features, namely a multifaceted, complex character 
with compatibility and coherence between these aspects. The higher the level of com-
plexity in new machines and devices, the stronger the need to follow the principle of 
non-contradiction. Correspondingly, as complexity increases this becomes ever more 
difficult and demanding.
The ability to think abstractly along with its concomitant operations may prove in-
dispensable here. The early 18th century idea of possible worlds may help make this 
clear. Formulated by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, it originally concerned alternative 
worlds in the mind of God and today it serves as an important idea in the field of modal 
logic. We will limit ourselves to the theory’s original meaning. Such worlds were con-
sidered “possible at least in the sense that they are logically consistent and […] complete 
in that they are possible totalities of creatures” (Adams 1999: 724). When we embark 
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on a comparison of such possible worlds with human inventions (and creativity), we 
actually compare macro worlds with micro worlds. Understandably, there are some im-
portant differences and incompatibilities. Nevertheless, by making comparisons and 
highlighting differences we can reveal some similarities. With regards to creativity in 
contemporary sciences and technologies, the ability to design theories and things that 
are logically consistent is vital. This is a kind of axiom. Furthermore, an analogy can be 
made between the Leibnizian notion of possible totalities of creatures and the notion of 
a set of constituents. New inventions – in contrast to possible worlds – are realities com-
plete in themselves but only in a relative sense. Maintaining the essential features of the 
invention, their formula can be changed and improved. In practice this means that many 
new component parts may be constantly added, modified and replaced. The ability to 
work out new elements, provided that we adhere to rules of logic and compatibility, is a 
form of creative imagination enabled by understanding and learning.6
Also, the idea of possible worlds is a mind “opener” and brings with it the message 
that the same thing (i.e. an artifact) – while keeping in mind its essential features – 
can exist in various different forms. Consequently, it can be designed in multiple ways 
where there exist alternative compositions of the same thing.7 In many respects, such 
a thing has an open formula. None of the working solutions concerning a given arti-
fact exhausts the range of possibilities. Rather, the opposite is true: namely the im-
plementation of the given solution usually reveals its own limits and calls for its own 
modification and a new version. Thus, we can devise both new ways of realizing the 
main features or functions of the thing, as well as new sets and additional character-
istics. In this way, a relative openness in designing projects and things indeed plays 
the role of “stimulant” and when treated seriously may result in a novel approach to 
previous solutions, things and ideas.
Other interesting insights are delivered by the principle of tertium non datur, or 
the law of excluded middle. Aristotle put it this way: “there cannot be an intermediate 
between contradictories” (1941a: IV, 7). Or, “of opposites, contradictories admit of no 
middle term” (1941a: X, 7). In contemporary discussions this principle has a threefold 
interpretation: any being exists in its determined content or does not exist at all; any 
being exists or does not exist, and possesses a feature c or does not possess it; between 
being and non-being there is nothing intermediate (Herbut 1997b: 558). This principle 
with its contemporary developments serves as a “cleaner” of our thinking. It helps us 
to avoid various fallacies concerning the inner structure of a given project or thing. 
Looking from the other side, we can claim that the more we apply this principle, the 
more a given novelty is congruent as far as its parts and constituents are concerned.
6 This thesis can be controversial and hence it has its limits. We do not claim that every reality can be con-
stantly changed and modified. Neither does everything have an open formula, as it is claimed next. There are 
some natural or ethical limits to such enterprises. But this is not the subject of this paper.
7 But what is important here is that there is a kind of passage from one composition to the other. It is so because 
in the theory of possible worlds a conviction is entertained that “intuitively, one world is accessible from an-
other if and only if the former is possible in (or from the point of view of) the latter” (Adams 1999: 724).
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Nevertheless, we can entertain some doubts as to a validity of the principle in the 
process of searching for various novelties. It seems that at times new ideas and inven-
tions appear in and occupy a middle ground between things known and used already. 
It sometimes happens that a new discovery is a collection of elements coming from 
various opposites. Such possibilities as an animal-human hybrid or genetically modi-
fied organisms come to mind.
To clarify this issue, we should introduce further distinctions. It seems reasonable to 
discriminate between various elements that can possibly come to a new composition and 
elements that are clearly in opposition to each other, and hence exclude each other. A 
researcher is naturally inclined to experiment on various elements trying to establish if 
they can end up within a new whole. In the same respect, those elements cannot contra-
dict each other or – as we said already – attenuate each other because the new whole will 
then be unachievable. That is why the exclusion of a middle ground is vital. However, 
such a middle ground can take place when we consider various aspects of the same thing. 
For instance, something can be active in one respect and passive in the other.
Even if we consider elements that oppose each other, we should ponder several pos-
sibilities. First, the opposition can be apparent but not real, that is a deeper insight into 
a relation between given elements can reveal that there indeed is no opposition between 
them. Second, opposing elements can be complementary from a different perspective. 
It depends on a leading idea, that is the idea that is to gather and organize them. One 
idea can make some elements opposed to each other, whereas another idea can make 
them coherent within a structure constituted by that idea. Thus, in the case of the prob-
lem we tend to solve, the main idea we employ is really vital. The latter can lead to a 
configuration of various elements in a way that they cooperate with each other, at least 
in some aspects. Finally, we can underline a twofold role of contradiction in solving a 
novel situation or in inventing a new thing. At the outset, contradiction among candid-
ates aspiring to this job is a positive sign because it stimulates thinking and research. 
The researcher is pressed, in a sense, to overcome the contradiction and this can put him 
on the verge of something novel. But gradually when we acquire a stage of new inven-
tion, any contradiction must be eliminated even at the expense of some aspects of that 
newness (Woleński 1996). Here the role of the principle of the excluded middle is vital.
Theoretical notions in action: a second approach
Thinking through the prism of analogy can be very helpful in our analyses. This is a 
very old philosophical term and the theory of analogy is quite complex. We are only 
going to stick to a general description of that. Within this philosophical attitude, we 
assume that the world we live in is pluralistic, that it is not a one-dimension reality, 
hence we cannot directly and thoroughly compare many things and objects. We can 
do that by employing a strategy, which enables us to perceive similarities despite es-
sential differences. Without analogical thinking we will be imprisoned in the details 
and particulars, and a synthetic grasp of reality would be impossible. Thus, to formu-
late a complex vision and project we really need to draw on analogy.
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There are various kinds of analogy. For instance, the analogy of proportionality 
helps us to claim, as W. Norris Clarke, S. J. puts it, that “a worm knows; a human be-
ing knows; God knows”. However, he adds:
“that the similarity expressed is not directly between two essences or natures as 
such, which in themselves are just different, but between their respective activities, 
what they do, as somehow truly similar, while at the same time these natures are 
quite different in how they exercise this activity” (2001: 46–47).
The analogy of proportionality can help us to not only perceive similarities but 
also dissimilarities. The latter constitute a starting point in our perception: we look 
for similarities because what strikes us at the beginning is a clear set of dissimilarit-
ies. Shedding some light on the latter or realizing fully what they are about can pave 
the surer way for perceiving the former. Moreover, a good command of this theory 
should result in the ability to discern what the essence of a given thing is and what the 
accident, the nature and the function are. As a first consequence, it should help us to 
introduce proper and precise distinctions. At any rate, it is a necessary starting point 
in any creative and innovative attitude.
The analogy of proportionality can be an engine of creative thinking in a many 
ways. We want to sketch here only one of them. We take as a starting point an entity 
that is characterized by its advanced functions. Understandably that can be the hu-
man being with his various activities and functions. Then we can realize that other 
things – e.g. artificial machines – can resemble this model, of course not in a literal 
sense. This “mirroring” can take place not only in a formal way but also in a ma-
terial way. In the former approach, we can see how those machines are linked with 
their respective activities and functions; and consequently we can improve those re-
lations. Within the material approach, we can undertake an attempt to translate hu-
man perfections into artificial realities via analogical thinking drawing upon possib-
ilities delivered by contemporary sciences and technologies. The same can be done 
between other things: those more advanced can serve as an inspiration and models 
for those we want to construct. Of course, there are clear limits as to the applicability 
of various functions. Not everything that is entertained by the human being can be 
translated into artificial things. Nevertheless, the theory of analogy stimulates our 
imagination in this respect.
Philosophy can be helpful in fostering creative thinking because of its main fea-
ture, namely that it tends to encompass the whole. It was a very basic idea of Plato and 
Aristotle that philosophy should overcome particular aspects and help us to cognit-
ively grasp the whole. Nowadays, there are two problems with such an approach, es-
pecially in the realm of exact or technical sciences. First, it seems that those sciences 
celebrate their triumph just because they concentrate on particular aspects. The spirit 
of scholarly specialization is the engine that leads to new discoveries and inventions. 
Thus, the approach characterized by looking at the whole can be easily considered as 
a distraction from this trend. Second, it seems that knowledge concerning the whole 
of reality is so complex that it seems almost unachievable. Many exact sciences are in-
volved in its enquiry and we are far from a unified picture of that reality. In this paper, 
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we are not going to question or play down these difficulties but we want to show that 
the attitude directed to the whole is possible and can be complementary and inspiring.
This is definitely the case when we investigate realities that go beyond the meth-
odology of empirical sciences. Although there are a good number of philosophers who 
claim that everything should be treated in the light of a naturalistic methodology, a 
more cautious approach seems reasonable. A good example of such an approach is 
given by Roger Scruton. His thesis goes as follows:
“there is a widespread habit of declaring emergent realities to be ‘nothing but’ the 
things in which we perceive them. The human person is ‘nothing but’ the human 
animal; law is ‘nothing but’ relations of social power; sexual love is ‘nothing but’ the 
urge to procreation; altruism is ‘nothing but’ the dominant genetic strategy […]; the 
Mona Lisa is ‘nothing but’ a spread of pigments on a canvas; the Ninth Symphony is 
‘nothing but’ a sequence of pitched sounds of varying timbre. And so on. Getting rid 
of this habit is, to my mind, the true goal of philosophy” (2014b: 39–40).
Here, Scruton does not recommend a kind of escape from particulars to general-
ities but he warns us against a position of reductionism. The latter can block out in-
vestigation and we can avoid it in our proceedings only when investigating particulars 
we keep our eyes on complex wholes. Humanistic mentality, where philosophy plays 
its major role, can be indispensable here because it conveys the important message 
that information is usually associated with its parts but meanings with the whole. And 
thus one cannot replace one with the other or compensate one for the other.
Aristotle was aware that general knowledge is always gained at the expense of 
particular knowledge. Describing one of the basic attitudes of the philosopher, he 
pointed out that “the wise man knows all things, as far as possible, although he has 
not knowledge of each of them in detail” (1941a: I, 2). We can even put it stronger: 
the greater the body of general knowledge, the poorer particular insights, and vice 
versa. Nevertheless, they do not exclude each other and it seems that they are rather 
complementary. At the first glance, we can claim that general knowledge is fueled by 
particular expertise and the latter would be very local and limited in its application if 
detached from general knowledge. But there are further and more intricate relations 
between each other.
Let us assume that a researcher possesses a specialist knowledge concerning his 
area of expertise. His main aim is to increase the body of this knowledge because 
such a move can be a prerequisite of discoveries he is going to make in the future. 
Yet at the same time, let us suppose that he is embarking on acquiring knowledge 
concerning other fields of inquiry or, say, general knowledge unrelated to his field. As 
Aristotle suggested, that general knowledge will be not so specialist as the knowledge 
concerning the researcher’s field. But this combination can bear fruit in unexpected 
ways. First, it can provide the researcher with a kind of distance from his subject and 
in this way it can help him to remain more critical in his scientific endeavors. Second, 
with regard to his own research, the scientist can draw inspiration from other fields 
of exact sciences or from other seemingly unrelated realms. Creative imagination 
is indeed the fruit of the perception of the same thing coming from various angles. 
Moreover, the human mind can be attributed with a kind of plasticity. This means that 
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approaching a new thing, the mind identifies with it for the sake of its cognitive pen-
etration. But doing that, the mind is already equipped with other ideas and insights. 
Thus the interplay of the new coming from the thing and the set of ideas possessed 
already by the mind can bear a real novelty. Usually it is a new synthesis that caters to 
our needs but, in the longer run, it can be a starting point for further research (it can 
constitute the background for further research).
Thinking through the prism of the whole can bring with it further benefits. 
Someone who has the mental disposition to look to the whole but spends a good deal 
of his time working on particulars can experience a kind of tension and discomfort. 
Nevertheless, it can be a constructive and creative feeling. Advancing his research on 
a detail, he can ask himself about the purpose of it within the whole. Further, he can 
inquire into the relationship between this detail and other details, namely how they 
are or should be linked. Thus, knowing the limits and borderlines of the particular he 
is working on, the researcher is more disposed to perceive the meanings and roles of 
other aspects. Moreover, a mature awareness of the purposes of the particulars will 
only be ascertained when we know the purpose(s) of the whole as such, where the 
details usually play the role of constituents or aspects. Being aware of the purpose of 
the whole, the researcher gains additional control over the purpose of the respective 
particular as if from on high. Consequently, he can design that particular in such a 
way that it is in harmony with the given whole but at the same time it can also be ac-
commodated within another whole (a new composition, invention). Seen in this way, 
functionality and creativity do not exclude each other but can be complementary.
The outlook on the whole yields a general knowledge and this is usually the terrain 
in which less general ideas can appear. The creative mind is aware that general know-
ledge has the capacity to stimulate a very broad set of particular ideas prompted by 
a need for practical solutions and innovations. Particular ideas and applications very 
rarely exhaust the potential of the former. They constitute, in a sense, the intersection 
between what the knowledge already had and the demands presented by a given con-
text and situation. Thus sticking to the general view, even if we are chiefly interested 
in particular aspects, is very important.
Conclusions
Philosophy gives us a specific approach to the world. It informs the philosopher’s 
investigation concerning the theoretical aspects and possibilities of the object of his 
inquiry. This mode of investigation has its advantages and can be considered as the 
background of creativity. But when we want to use philosophy for practical purposes, 
arising here and now, we need to enlarge this approach. As Aristotle put it: “a man 
err if he knows the major premiss and not the minor, which is the position when our 
knowledge is merely general” (1949: Bk. I, ch. 21). Dealing with practical things we 
must complement and specify general knowledge. This can be done by taking into 
account the context determined by specific needs and expectations. We can even 
claim that the practical demands put in front of a person with a philosophy-oriented 
mind can stimulate her creativity, thus making use of theory for the sake of innovative 
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practice. We do not want to claim that all such persons put in similar situations will 
become original inventors. Nevertheless, they are in a sense prepared to do that, even 
though, as it may happen, they do not, at first, realize it.
In general, the essential factors leading to creative results are these: a good com-
mand of general concepts and rules, which are usually acquired via philosophical edu-
cation; a knowledge concerning the specific field of research; an intuition of novelty; 
an ability to make a synthesis of things and in this way to work out new compositions. 
With regard to the latter, we can point out that novelty stems from the joining of 
seemingly unrelated things or of old ones with new ones. Thus creativity never starts 
from nothing. The researcher must draw on things existing so far but it is a matter of 
his ingenuity whether he can propose new creations and solutions.
In conclusion, many sciences and the humanities can lead to the formation of a creat-
ive personality. Interestingly this has been shown by Scruton, who pointed to the study 
of Latin and Greek, algebra and logic, and even of astrophysics.8 Pursued for their own 
sake, these specialist branches of knowledge can yield unexpected results when a human 
subject is confronted with sudden situations in demanding circumstances. This is even 
truer when we think about philosophy and its role in the formation of the human mind. 
Philosophy offers a complex apparatus of general notions and methods, which can be a 
starting point for a multitude of specific solutions and novelties. It can do thus because 
it takes us beyond the given data to a set of presuppositions, on the one hand, and to 
new fields of possible applications, on the other. Philosophy helps us to look at specific 
things from a distance and in this way it can enormously empower the researcher in his 
pursuits. Thus, further inquiry into the philosophical foundations of creative thinking 
presents itself as both attractive and promising.
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KUO FILOSOFIJA GALI BŪTI NAUDINGA 
KŪRYBINIAM MĄSTYMUI
Grzegorz HOŁUB, Piotr DUCHliŃSKi
Santrauka
Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kad filosofija gali pasitarnauti kūrybiniam mąs-
tymui. Nors remiamasi tik tam tikrais pasirinktais filosofiniais konceptais ir tai-
syklėmis, stengiamasi įrodyti, kad asmuo, patekęs į jam nepažintas ir sudėtin-
gas situacijas bei gerai įvaldęs šias idėjas, gali generuoti naujas ir kurti naujus 
projektus. Atitinkamai gebėjimas abstrakčiai mąstyti tam tikromis ypatingomis 
aplinkybėmis gali nuvesti pozityvių ir nenumatytų rezultatų link. Taip mąsty-
mo „plastiškumas“, kurį formuoja filosofijos studijos ir įgytas išsilavinimas, 
gali tapti kūrybingumo varikliu. Šiame straipsnyje gilinamasi į žmones, kurie 
studijuoja filosofiją (oficialiai ar neoficialiai) ir kurie savo profesiniame gyveni-
me yra įsitraukę į įvairias darbo bei veiklos rūšis, kuriose kūrybinis mąstymas 
yra reikalingas ir netgi būtinas. Šis straipsnis – tai filosofinės euristikos dalis.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: abstraktus mąstymas, kūrybingumas, išradimai, naujos 
idėjos, filosofija.
